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'·' THE SUPRC:ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

, IU'r)
>

T l'JN ,

:;U{ALS

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
ROSE K. GEORGAS

Plaintiff,
-v-

Case No. 19036

L\L COti)IISSION
LTAH. and Rose K. Georgas,
dow cF Alex Demetrios
Defendants.

I.

OF NATURE OF CASE

This is a ?roceeding to review the lawfulness of an
0

;;2:-d !Jy the Industrial Co=ission of Utah to the dependents of
Demetrios Georgas, deceased.
I I. DISPOS IT ION BY r-!E INDUSTRIAL COi·01ISS ION OF UTAH
On November 18, 1982, Administrative Law Judge Timothy
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
benefits to the dependents of Alex Demetrios Georgas in

,.1s2

Uo.

82001754.

Said Order was affirmed by the Industrial

r.)r.::iission on February 2, 1983.
III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Rose K. Georgas, fer herself and the dependent
·.,: ld-ec< of Alc>x Demetrios Georgas, seek affirmance of the Order
Tndustrial Co'!Tilission, and, pursuant to Section 35-1-38,
,1ta'=ccc', l953, as amended, request a preferential setting
on the calendar of the Utah Supreme Court.

IV.

ST.us;·IE::T

QJ:'

Facts set forth in Plainciff' s Briel, \-ilch tr.cc

l L·1o.·i"e

November 16, 1981, the testimony o1 his daugh:e::-, 'J.:'issie, ::
that she was called by Mc. Georgas at

5:30

November 16, 1981, while he apparently was on his lunch brec'
(See Plaintiff's Brief, p.

3).

On p. 1, of Plaintiff's Brief, the following is stacc:
regarding the location of the settling tank in which the bod·1
tr.e deceased was fou:id:

"This settling tanK is located pcrna:.

quarter of a mile away from any possible work areas or trd·:c.:
of the deceased ... "

There is no testimon7 or other evide'1cE: :-

the record suggesting a distance between the points indicate:.
Exhibit D-2 would suggest that the decedent's work stacion is
imately 200-300 yards from the settling tank.

Again on p.

4,

statement is made: "Plaintiff's medical witness ... did nJt 'out drowning as the ultimate cause of his [decedent's] death.'
I:i fact,

that witness specifically confirmed death by d1-o-..mi

(R 161, 170).
Also on o.

4, Plaintiff states:

"The evidence "'as

uncontroverted t::iat there were no direct, indirect. or even irr
duties related to the deceased' s employment as a tri?per ope:a:
which would require or even explain his ;:iresence
settling tank where he was found."

The

ern;:iloyment is a legal issue which wilJ
portion of this brief.

-2-

the: cL•.
o' ic.c'.1c·,·

te accr<essed in

.

1

!.

STATE:1Eca OF POINTS

THE l:JDVSB.IAL COC!MISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED
I '':>1PLOY;u:::ff'' A:•lALYSIS AS TO CAUSATION IN AWARDING
fU THE WIDOW AND CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED WORKER.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND ORDER
ARE. ;iUi "A?.BITRA.R.Y AND CAPRICIOUS," OR "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE,"

,,R CONTRARY TO THE "ONE [INEVITABLE] CONCLUSION FROM THE EVIDENCE"
,J;z ''IITHOliT "A.."lY SUi3STANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEM," AND

THEREFORE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
VI. ARGUMENT
POINT I
Tl-iE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORECTLY APPLIED "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"
,1iiALYSIS AS TO CAUSATION IN AWARDING BENEFITS TO THE WIDOW !u'ID
ctGLDREil OF THE DECEASED WORKER.

In its Brief, Plaintiff focuses on an alleged failure of
of causal connection between the decedent's employment and
his death.

Although there are some statements which may be inter-

Jfeted to the contrary, it appears that Plaintiff does not dispute
that decedent's death was "by accident ... "

Section 35-1-45.

Thne is clearly substantial evidence in the :-ecord to support the
finding

the Industrial CoUIDlission that the decedent was killed

by accident.

The issue as framed by Plaintiff, therefore, is that

th2re must be a causal relationship between the death and the
"'"Ployec;'s employment duties.

This, it is respectfully submitted,

' - mis2pr2hension and misapplication of the appropriate analysis
-<:n 'c_ecl i:-i c'etermining whether the employee was killed "in

-3-

From its 01-Hening Motion tJ Disrciss
defendant's cier:iorand

1

JEl

L,1

iLs

in Support of Ciai'.'1 fur

:·_,

1

-.L1.

Burial Benefits to its lfotion for ReconsiJera:i1rn or ''e'1ie•,, ,
Brief to this Court, Plaintiff has consistently f di lced to
the appropriate causation analysis related to death in the
of employment.

COCT•

The failure to apply correct causation principle:

and the insistence on applying causation principles applicable
tort law has resulted in Plaintiff's claim of no substantial
evidence to supporc the award of the Commission.
In pointing out the uniqueness of Utah's
statute in requiring that injury or death arise out of or in the
course of employment, the Utah Supreme Court in l1 & K Corporatic:
v. Industrial Corr.mission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (19481
stated:
The distinction being that in order for
an accident to arise out of the employment a more definite and closer causal
relationship is required than is necessary
for an accident to arise in the course
of employment, but in the latter a closer
relationshio must exist as to time and
place and
to the nature and type of
work being perfon!led, in other words
the requirement that the accident arise
in the course of the employment is
satisfied if it occurs while the employee
is rendering service to his employer
which he was hired to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time
when and the place where he was authorized to render such service.
Plaintiff's conceptual difficulty arises from i'.:o >rs_
tence that there be some causal connection between the injur1
death and the duties of the worker's employment.
- .f-

Causal relaci.

,,,.tcwc:en Lhe employment and the accident is a much different
1a 1

,,1

',,,

causal r<eLitionship between the duties of employment

.,c:ident, for it is generally recognized that the mere

r;:ic<. t\oat the expressed duties of employment are not being performed,
not imply that a worker is out of the course of his employment.
fhis is a natural consequence of the fact that "the requirement
that the accident arise in the course of the employment is satisfied
if it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer
which he was hired to do or doing something incidental thereto, at
the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such
service:· Id.

This point was emphasized in Prows v. Industrial

Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah

1980), where this Court stated:

It must be kept clearly in mind that
the statute requires that the injury
arise in the course of employment, not
that the injured worker be in the course
of his employment. 610
at 1363,
n. 3).
See also, Wilson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 14 Utah 2d 360, 384 P.2d
400 (1963), where this Court stated that "an employee does not
necessarily and ipso facto lose his status as such when the noon
whist le blows," and Askren v. Indus trial Commission, 15 Utah 2d
275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964), where compensation was granted to a worker
who was injured during a lunch break.
Plaintiff's confusion is further pointed out by its
rdiar-.ce on Staheli
:

1

d 680 (Utah

v. Famers' Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655

U82), for the proposition that "[w]hen the proximate

cdUSe of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a
matter of law ... "

It is clear that the tort concept of "proximate

-5-

Industrial

tf-.e C.:iur: st.1C1._'d

This Court, alJng

the

uf

other jurisdictions, has
that c0nc:epts of
Ct)r.trib1Jt ;r/
negligence, fault, and similar tort
concepts have no place within the
remedial framework of the compensation
act.
610 P.2d at
(Emphasis
added.)
The causation principle at work in compensation cases
the connection between the accident and the injury or
Redman Warehousing Coro. v. Indus trial Co= is s ion, 22 Utah 2d · "'
454 P.2d 283, 285 (1969), this Court stated:
The claimant has not met the onus of
proving an 'accident' in the course
of his employment that 'caused' the
'tnjurv' of which he complained,
w ich burden is his. (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, the issue presented by "course of employment."
analysis is whether the worker had so departed from the tirr.e,

c:"

and incidents of his employment that it can be inferred that
intended to abandon his job temporarily. Cf.

lA Larson, The L2c·1

of Workmen's Comoensation (1979), Section 21.00, p. 5-4.

lnt'.e

context of the instar.t case, the record contains substantial e":l·_·

supporting the finding of the Industrial Commission that deced2,1·
was in the course of his employment at the time of his death, as
will be pointed out in Point II of this brief.
When the correct analytical structure
worker's compensation "course of employ:nent" caus&tion

i

is applied to this case, Plaintiff's causation analysis is si•·'

-6-

1,...._"

_,_t_ l_

<...:'. (_':

l ' '--'.

re 0f

·Ih2!1 this defendant admitted in her Hemorandum
there was nothing directly connected with
duties as a tripper operator which required

.. cs

:.ir2sence at the settling tank pond where his body was found,

she waco doing no more (and she so stated R. 210) than pointing out
that this case would have to be approached from "course of employment' analysis rather than "arising out of" the employment analysis.
The distinction is a valid one as shown by M & K Corporation v.
Industrial Commission, supra.

A correct application of the approp-

riate analytical structure shows that there was substantial evidence
to support the award of compensation by the Industrial Commission.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE NOT "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS," OR "WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE," OR CONTRARY TO THE "ONE [ INEVITABLE] CONCLUSION FROM THE EVIDENCE" OR WITHOUT "ANY SUBSTANTIAL
sVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEM," AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
As recently stated by the Court in Ogden Standard Examiner
Industrial Commission, No. 18311, filed April 20, 1983, Judge
Durham stated for a unanimous Court:
The standard of review utilized by this
Court in Industrial Commission cases is
stringent:
[Our inquiry is] whether the
Comission's findings are
trary and capricious', or
'wholly without cause' or
contrary to the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the
evidence' or without 'any
substantial evidence' to
support them. Only then
should theCommission's
findings be displaced.
(Citing Saba's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, Utah, 642
-7-

p . 2 d 7 _: ,

I

2)

(

C, _:

Kaiser Scee: 1:0:-Q.
Utah,

t '_ 1 \ '

I

.

·1

•

i

"

)

.

ment analysis reflects the following:
There is no dispute that decedent died at a time
was at work, during his regular shift.

The place of his

"""

on the Plaintiff's premises, some few hundred yards at most
the spot where he performed his duties as tripper operator.
(Exhibit D-2).

If his body had been found at the copper r:1i:"te :r

at the smelter in Magna, it perhaps could be said that '.:he dis:c::
involved showed an intent on decendent' s part to abandon his e:;:J_:
ment.

However, neither is the case here.

As far as pure

proximity goes, Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that decedent
abandoned his employment.

In fact, Plaintiff has emphasized, a:.:

the record supports, decedent's strict and rigid adherence to hi
work routine.

(R. 124, 132, 149, 178).

0

However, this evidence

must be viewed as negativing any inference that decedent ma; he::
abandoned his employment.

Such abandonment would, according

.o

the undisputed evidence, have been totally out of charact8r for
decedent.
Furthermore, although it is true ::hat ci1ere is nc
apparent reason for decedent being where he was at the time or
death in the light of the

of a tripper operator, i: is

generally recognized that the mece fact thac the

1

of employment are not being performed, does not imply
worker is out of the course of his e'.'.lp lo;menc.
-8-

L'.-2t

In Unite·j

a

_

613 P.2d 508, 509 (Utah

1980), this Court

is
taLr nor realistic that
an employee will always keep within
the narrow bounds of one assigned
task .... The scope of one's employment
includes not only the specific duties
assigned, but also those things which
it should reasonably be expected an
employee would do in connection with
those duties ...
The record here reflects that the decedent was last seen
"" .-"'- by his co-workers during the lunch break.

The record reflects

tne drinking water supply in the operations center where the
wor!:e::-s ate their lunch was inoperative and that drinking water
was available in the old operations center which sits just to the
west of the settling pond.

(R. 138-139).

Also, the available

water was on the same level as the settling pond.

(R.

Unfortunately, death has sealed the lips of the only person
cccild say ·,;hy decedent was where he was when he died.
•..

However,

absence of any evidence to suggest that decedent or his

fellow workers were forbidden by company rule or regulation from
by

pond, it cannot be said that decedent was so far

removed from the incidents of his work, be it for meeting personal
cumfort needs or otherwise, that he can be said to have left the
se of his employ:nent.
This Court has consistently held that the worker's
should be liberally construed and if there is
·•:br

right to compensation it should be resolved

.,r 0f a recovery.

See, s,_g., M & K Corporation v.

-9-

Industrial

Commissior.,

oqira, 139 P ..

ularl:1 calls for a

c:r
anc'.

beneficent purposes of the L8nper1sa:i0n
while at the job and under circums;:ances which,
in the light of "course of employment" analysis do not indic:n 1
other thar: the death is compensable.

Here deced<cnt' s benefi

and dependents stand in no cogni::ably differen: position fr .Cl::.
family of a worker killed in 2n industrial mishap in :'uE:1 '-'c=·.·
his fellow workers.

Here, the death was unwit'.1essed but ·:·1as,

is respectfully submitted, well within acceptable limics 0f t',,.,
place and incidents of employment so as to bring decedent'

c;

deo::

within the course of his employment and his dependents within
category of those entitled to benefits.
This Court has consistently "refused to open the d0::to a recovery for all injuries, without any causal relationshc:
between the employment <md the accident mcorely because the 2.:c:cc
occurs on the premises of the employer during the hours oE
employment ... "

See,

M & K Corporation v. Industri:d C·

supra; Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Co=ission, s:.:cci
However, in a case such as this, there is much force to the
logic behind the rule expressed in Section 10. 32 of l Li:1rson. T.,
Law of Workmen's Compensation (1979), that where a deced2nt is
found dead '..lnder circumstances indicating ;:he deat':l ccok :•I
within the time and space limits of the empL):··c,cent. elk--= "·
arise an inference tl'tat the death arose oc1t or the
Larson indicates that this rule is accepted by 30
-HJ-

.•c:nJ.,
,1

t!:le 2<1d, 3rd and 5th Circuit Courts of

:c.'g,l._•r,J.

e:{plains the rule as follows:

!he theorerical justification is similar
to that for unexplained falls and other
neutral harms:
The occurrence of the
death within the course of employment
at least indicates that the employment
brought deceased within range of the
harm, and the cause of harm, being unknown,
is neutral and not personal. The practical justification lies in the realization that, when the death itself has
removed the only possible witness who
could prove causal connection, fairness
to the dependents suggests some softening
of the rule requiring claimant to provide
affirmative proof of each requisite element
of compensability.

* * *
The fact the najority of courts will
award compensation in this ... type of
case is the best indication that there is
a distinct compensation principle holding
that unexplained deaths in the course of
employment are compensable. (Footnote
omitted). Id. at pp. 3-94 through 3-101.
Of course the reason Utah is not counted among the juris:i; ct ions •,;hich have adopted this principle is the fact that claim1nts here need not prove both that the death arose out of and in

the course of employment.

However, there is much =orce to the

lc,gic of che rule in "course of employment" analysis in that "the
itself has removed the only possible witness" who could say
·,!-,;

was w'.-iere he was, what he was doing, and what happened.

[W]hen employees have died as the result of
unwitnessed falls down elevator shafts,
fron buildings, from catwalks, from boats,
or
trains, a noncompensable origin
-11-

is virtually inconceiv3blQ.
is ruled act bj the
tion a2ainst
e'.'t·n i'.fall
was
lJ-; .1
attack, epilepsy, or other
weakness ... this would not
-:.'claim as long as the employment cc,ntributed such sources of increas2d
as trains, trucks, and heights.
notes omitted.) Id. at p. 3-103.

VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has shown that, contrary to
Plaintiff's assertions, there is substantial evidence in tho0 -.
to support the award of benefits to this defendant and her ::ib.:
children for the death of Alex Demetrios Georgas.

The fact

Plaintiff can even assert a failure of proof stems from ic:s re:.
to recognize the appropriate causation principles operative ir,
worker's compensation cases.

Proximate cause analysis has no

place in this setting; neither does the requirement for a cause
link between the duties of a worker's employment and any
death or injury.

Rather,

the correct causation principle linK'

the "accident" and the resulting death or injury.

In this ca1e

the "accident" was decedent's falling into the settling 0)Qnd co
Plaintiff's premises, whether as the result of slipping or sot.
idiopathic condition of decedent, which accident clearly caccse:
the death of decedent by drowning.

Furthermore, there is n·Jc ··

iota of evidence to suggest that decedent abandoned his
such that he thereby removed himself from the protection cf
compensation act.

It is, therefore, respectfull:: sucrr:i': .·c0l
0

the award of the Industrial Co:nmiss::.on should be
-12-
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